We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations completed in 1993-94 on the major industrialized and developing countries/regions. We estimate that the Uruguay Round negotiations increased global economic welfare by $73.0 billion. The developed countries overall have an estimated welfare gain of $53.8 billion, and the developing countries an estimated welfare increase of $19.2 billion.
I. Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze the trade liberalization provisions in the Uruguay Round and the prospective trade liberalization in the ongoing Doha Development Round, using the Michigan 
II. Overview of the Michigan CGE Model
The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that i t incorporates some aspects of the New Trade Theory, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product heterogeneity. A complete description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be found on line at www.spp.umich.edu/rsie/model/.
The version of the model that we will use consists of 20 countries/regions (plus rest-ofworld) and 18 production sectors. The country/region and sectoral coverage are indicated in the tables noted below. Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive and all other sectors as monopolistically competitive with free entry and exit of firms. The model is implemented using GEMPACK software, as described in Harrison and Pearson (1996) .
Needless to say, the data needs of the Michigan model are immense. The main data source is "The GTAP-4 Database" of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (McDougall et al., 1998) . The reference year for this database is 1995. We have extracted the following data, aggregated to our sectors and regions, from this source: The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonagricultural sectors of the model imposes an additional data requirement of the number of firms at the sectoral level. These data have been drawn from the United Nations, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1998 . 1 We also need estimates of sectoral employment for the countries/regions of the model. These data come from: UNIDO, 1995, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, and the World Bank, 1997, World Development Report. The employment data have been aggregated according to our sectoral/regional aggregation to obtain sectoral estimates of workers employed in manufactures. The World Development Report was used to obtain data for the other sectors.
We have projected the GTAP-4 1995 database to the year 2005 by extrapolating the labor availability in different countries/regions by an average weighted growth rate of 1.2 per cent per annum. This figure was computed from the growth-rate forecasts for the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] provided for various countries in 
III. Computational Scenarios of Uruguay Round Liberalization
The projected database provides us with an approximate picture of what the world could be expected to look like in 2005 if the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations had not occurred. The UR reductions in trade barriers were implemented beginning in 1995 and will be completed by
2005. Accordingly, we have analyzed the impact of the UR-induced changes that are expected to occur over the course of the 10-year implementation period as a consequence of the negotiated reductions in tariffs and NTBs. 3 The scaled-up database for 2005 is then readjusted to mimic the world as it might look in the post-UR implementation. In Section IV following, we will report on some liberalization scenarios for the ongoing WTO (Doha) negotiating round, involving possible reductions in tariffs on agricultural products and manufactures and reductions of barriers to services trade.
In this section, we report on the following three scenarios: 4 used the number-of-firms data for similar countries in these cases. 2 See Hertel and Martin (1999) and Hertel (2000) for a more elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating year 2005 projections. See also our discussion below on the 2005 projections. 3 It should be noted that we are not considering the effects of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the other agreements on rules and procedures that were encompassed in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 4 Agricultural liberalization in the Uruguay Round negotiations was presumably to be as follows: agricultural import tariffs were to be reduced by 20 percent for the industrialized countries and by 13 percent for the developing countries; agricultural export subsidies were to be reduced by 36 percent for the industrialized countries and by 24 percent for the developing countries; and agricultural production subsidies were to be reduced by 20 percent for the industrialized countries and by 14 percent for the developing countries. However, as noted in Francois (2001b, p. 11) : "Basically, in agriculture, we are in a world that allows scope for great policy discretion and uncertainty as a result of the loose commitments made." What this means is that many countries introduced quantitative restrictions on imports in the form of tariff-rate quotas. There is also evidence of considerable leeway in the choice of the reference period from which to measure reductions in export subsidies. Furthermore, the disciplines on domestic subsidies were weakened by changes in the definition of the Aggregate Measure of Support. As a consequence, relatively little agricultural liberalization Francois and Strutt (1999) for details on the post-UR tariff rates. 6 There have been a substantial number of CGE modeling studies of the Uruguay Round that are summarized and critiqued in Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1996) and Francois (2001a) .
partners tend to experience a real depreciation of their currencies in order to maintain a constant trade balance, so that all countries therefore experience mixtures of both expanding and contracting sectors.
Worldwide, these changes tend to cause increased international demand for all sectors, with world prices rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most. This in turn causes changes in countries' terms of trade that can be positive or negative. Those countries that are net exporters of goods with the greatest degree of import-tariff liberalization will experience increases in their terms of trade as the world prices of their exports rise relative to their imports.
The reverse occurs for net exporters in industries where liberalization is slight --perhaps because it already happened in previous trade rounds.
The effects on the economic welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-oftrade effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional effects due to elements of the New Trade Theory, the latter of which are mostly, but not all, beneficial. 7 Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should raise national welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every country, although some factor owners within a country may lose, as will be noted below. However, it is possible for a particular country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains.
On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for introducing new reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution is to expand the list of reasons for gains from trade. It is these that are the dominant contrib ution of the New
Trade Theory in our model. That is, trade liberalization permits all countries to expand their 7 See discussion below. export sectors at the same time that all sectors compete more closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad. As a result, countries as a whole tend to gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions due to greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety. All of these effects make it more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across the entire population.
In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor -the "scarce factor" -to lose through the mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941) . The additional sources of gain from trade due to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however, are shared across factors, and we routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital may gain from liberalization. That is often the case here.
One additional point about our model should be mentioned, related to the modeling and role of nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as those applying to textiles and apparel. These are quantitative restrictions, captured in the model by endogenous tariff equivalents that rise and fall with changing supplies and demands for trade. The tariff equivalents generate quota rents that accrue to whatever group is granted the rights to trade under the restriction, which in the case of the MFA are the developing countries that export textiles and wearing apparel. Liberalization of these NTBs reduces or eliminates these quota rents, and this can be costly to those who possessed them disproportionately beforehand. Therefore, it is not the case that exporting countries necessarily benefit from relaxation of these trade barriers, since their loss of quota rents can more than outweigh their gains from i ncreased exports. Indeed, their exports can actually decline, along with their national welfare, if increased exports from other countries displace them in world markets.
In the real world, all of these effects encompassed by the Michigan Model occur over time, some of them more quickly than others. Our model is however static, based upon a single set of equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time. Our results therefore refer to a time horizon that is somewhat uncertain, depending on the assumptions that have been made about which variables do and do not adjust to changing market conditions, and on the shortor long-run nature of these adjustments. Because our elasticities of supply and demand reflect relatively long-run adjustments, and because we assume that markets for both labor and capital clear within countries, our results are appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several years -perhaps two or three at a minimum.
On the other hand, our model does not allow for the very long-run adjustments that could occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and technological change. Our results
should therefore be thought of as being superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved. To the extent that these growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, our model does not capture that.
Aggregate Results
In table 1, we report various economy-wide changes for each of the countries/regions of the model. These include changes in exports and imports in millions of dollars, the changes in terms of trade, real wage rate and real return to capital in percentages, and changes in economic welfare measured by equivalent variation, both in millions of dollars and as percent of country GDP. The terms of trade is the world price of a country's exports relative to its imports. The equivalent variation is the amount of money that, if given to the country's consumers at initial prices, would be equivalent in terms of their level of welfare to the effects of the assumed liberalization. In general, as discussed above, a worsening (fall) in a country's terms of trade has an adverse effect on its consumers' welfare. But this can be outweighed by the other gains from trade due to economic efficiency and the other benefits modeled by the New Trade Theory. It is noteworthy that the developed countries all gain, with an increase in welfare of $23.7 billion for the EU/EFTA, $19.8 billion for the United States, and $6.9 billion for Japan. All the developing countries/regions, except Hong Kong, show an increase in welfare from the combined UR liberalization. Changes in the real wage and the return to capital are positive but relatively small for the developed countries, and relatively sizable in several of the Asian developing countries.
UR-1: Elimination of the MFA Quota Constraints

Sectoral Results
A major contribution of our CGE modeling is to identify those sectors that will expand and those that will contract as a result of various patterns of trade liberalization, as well as the sizes of these changes. Given our assumption that expenditure adjusts within each country to maintain a constant level of total employment, it is necessarily the case that each country experiences a mixture of expansions and contractions at the industry level. This must be true of employment, and it is likely to be true as well for industry output. (-226,363) , and industrial products and machinery. The percentage changes in employment are relatively small for the United States, except in textiles and wearing apparel.
The employment changes for India are relatively sizable in several sectors. In interpreting the employment changes, it should be noted that these changes would be mitigated given that the UR liberalization has been phased in over a ten-year period. We may also note, from the changes reported for Scale (output per firm), that there is evidence of positive scale effects for most of the sectors.
IV. Computational Analysis of the Doha Development Round
In this section, using the Michigan Model, we report some of the economic effects that may result from the ongoing Doha 
DR-2 Liberalization of manufactures is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay
Round tariffs on manufactures.
DR-3 Services liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in estimated post-Uruguay
Round services barriers.
DR-4 This combines DR-1, DR-2, and DR-3.
Data
As noted in Section II, our basic data source is the GTAP-4 Database, supplemented with employment data, and projected to 2005, which is when the Uruguay Round will have been fully implemented. The projected database has in turn been readjusted to include the results of the Uruguay Round implementation as analyzed above.
While services issues were addressed in the Uruguay Round, the main accomplishment was the creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is an umbrella agreement setting out the rules governing the four modes of providing services transactions.
These modes include: (1) cross-border services (e.g., telecommunications); (2) services provided to consumers visiting from abroad (e.g., tourism); (3) services requiring a domestic presence in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI); and (4) movement of natural persons. In an earlier study, Brown and Stern (2001) developed a new version of the Michigan Model for the purpose 8 As was the case in our analysis of the Uruguay Round negotiations, we do not consider the effects of the of analyzing the behavior of multinational firms, which are major providers of services, both intra-firm as well as in the production and sales of foreign affiliates located in host countries. 9 To approximate existing services barriers, Brown and Stern used estimates of barriers to FDI provided by Hoekman (2000) , based on the gross operating margins of services firms listed on national stock exchanges for the period, 1994-96. 10 We use these estimates here as ad valorem equivalent tariffs for the services sectors included in the current version of the Michigan Model.
Our simulation DR-3 assumes then that the services barriers are to be reduced by 33 percent in the Doha Round.
Aggregate Results
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The aggregate results of the assumed Doha Round scenarios are presented in Because of computer-capacity constraints, Brown and Stern used a 3-sector aggregation consisting of agriculture, manufactures, and services and a 20-country/region breakdown. They also made allowance for international flows of FDI and increases in capital stocks in response to the multilateral trade liberalization that they analyzed. 10 The gross operating margins were calculated as the differences between total revenues and total operating costs for construction, trade and transport, other private services, and government services. Some of the differences between total revenues and costs are presumably attributable to fixed cost. Given that the gross operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the margins can also be attributed to barriers to FDI. For this purpose, we have selected as a benchmark for each sector the country with the smallest gross operating margin, on the assumption that operations in this country can be considered to be freely open to foreign firms. The excess in any other country above the lowest benchmark is then taken to be due to barriers to establishment by foreign firms. That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost increase attributable to an increase in fixed cost borne by multinational corporations attempting to establish an enterprise locally in a host country. We further assume for purposes of our analysis here that we can interpret this cost increase as an ad valorem equivalent tariff on international services transactions generally. Further details are available from the authors on request. 11 The potential gains from the Doha Round are also analyzed in Hertel (2000) and Hertel, Hoekman, and Martin (2002) . These studies are based on the GTAP CGE model, which is a widely used modeling structure. Perfect competition is assumed in all sectors. National product differentiation (i.e., the results are available from the authors on request. In the model, the reductions in agricultural import tariffs will have the effects of tariff reductions already described. In the case of export subsidies, their effects will be to reduce world prices and raise domestic prices. When export subsidies are reduced, world prices would then rise and domestic prices in the subsidizing countries would fall, with the possible consequences that economic welfare may rise in the countries reducing their export subsidies and fall in net-importing countries now facing higher world prices. Similarly, production subsidies will have the effect of reducing prices both domestically and abroad. When production subsidies are reduced, the cost of agricultural products will rise with consequent terms-of-trade effects similar to those just discussed. In addition, depending on the input-output structure, a rise in the cost of agricultural inputs will push up marginal cost relative to average total cost in some sectors. In order to return to the optimal markup of price relative to marginal cost, firm output in these sectors has to fall, and economic welfare may then decline due to reduced scale economies.
In the underlying results, the reductions in agricultural import tariffs alone increase global economic welfare by $9.5 billion. Welfare increases in the EU/EFTA, Japan, the Asian developing countries, Mexico, and Turkey as resources are shifted away from agriculture.
Correspondingly, welfare declines in Australia/New Zealand, Canada, and the United States as resources are shifted to agriculture and away from nonagricultural increasing returns industries.
As noted above, when export subsidies are reduced, world prices would rise and domestic prices would fall. This is borne out in the underlying results insofar as welfare increases in the EU/EFTA and declines in all of the countries/regions in the model, except Thailand. Global welfare falls by an estimated $23.2 billion. When production subsidies are reduced, domestic and foreign prices rise, and depending on input-output structures, the increased cost of agricultural inputs may cause firm output in some sectors to decline for the reasons discussed above. In the Armington assumption) is also assumed, which may tend to exaggerate terms -of-trade effects.
underlying results, it turns out that the EU/EFTA region benefits the most when its agricultural production subsidies are reduced, whereas welfare declines for most developing countries/regions. Global welfare rises by $10.6 billion. Agricultural liberalization thus involves a complex of differential changes because both tariffs and subsidies are being reduced. The net effect indicated in Table 4 is a reduction in global welfare of $3.1 billion. 
DR-2: Liberalization of Manufactures
Sectoral Results
The sectoral results for DR-4 in the United States and India are presented for illustrative purposes in tables 5 and 6. The sectoral results for other scenarios and countries/regions are available from the authors on request. (-35,549) . As was the case with the sectoral results for the Uruguay Round trade liberalization noted in tables 2 and 3, it can expected that the Doha Round trade liberalization will be phased in over a period of several years so that possible sectoral employment dislocations would be mitigated.
V. Conclusions and Implications
The following conclusions can be drawn from our computational analysis of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations:
• The elimination of the MFA quota constraints is beneficial to economic welfare in the developed countries but detrimental to some of the developing countries/regions. The detrimental effects occur because of the decline in world prices and deterioration of the exporting countries' terms of trade, including the loss of quota rents.
• Because there is considerable evidence of backsliding from the formal Uruguay Round commitments to reduce agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and production subsidies, we assumed that no significant agricultural liberalization resulted from the Uruguay Round.
• The liberalization of trade in manufactures was beneficial to all the developed and developing countries/regions covered in the model.
• The combined effects of the Uruguay Round trade liberalization were welfare increasing for the developed and developing countries/regions, except for Hong Kong. The largest absolute gains were for the developed countries.
• The sectoral effects of the Uruguay Round trade liberalization varied, dependin g on the patterns of liberalization for individual countries. Employment dislocations appeared relatively small, considering that the trade liberalization was to be phased in over a tenyear period.
The computational results of assumed 33 percent reductions of trade barriers in the Doha Development Round negotiations can be summarized as follows:
• The assumed reductions in agricultural import tariffs, export subsidies, and production subsidies suggested that the EU/EFTA were the prime beneficiaries. The net effect on global welfare was negative, with the overall welfare decline from the reduction in export subsidies offsetting the overall gains from reductions in import tariffs and production subsidies.
• The effects of manufactures liberalization were uniformly positive for all developed and developing countries/regions. The industrialized countries had the largest absolute welfare increases, while several developing countries/regions had sizable gains as a percentage of their GDP.
• All of the developed and developing countries/regions had significant increases in welfare due to the assumed liberalization of services barriers. These welfare increases were substantially greater than the increases due to manufactures liberalization, although that result especially depends, of course, on the estimated sizes of the trade barriers in services and the extent to which they will be reduced.
• The combined effects of the assumed Doha Development Round liberalization were sizable in both absolute and percentage terms for the developed and developing countries/regions. The largest absolute gains were for the developed countries.
• Sectoral employment dislocations would be mitigated insofar as the Doha Round liberalization would be phased in over several years time.
Our computational results thus suggest that there are substantial benefits to be realized from the Doha Development Round negotiations, especially for manufactures and services and for both developed and developing countries. This is in contrast to the effects of the Uruguay
Round trade liberalization, which may have been tilted against developing countries.
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We should note, as discussed above, that our computational model is based on a comparative static approach, meaning that we move from an initial pos ition to a new equilibrium in which all of the liberalization occurs at one time. That is, we abstract from a variety of dynamic and related effects that may occur through time, especially the international mobility of real capital, increases in real investment via capital accumulation, and technological improvements. The economic benefits that we have calculated, especially for the Doha Development Round, may therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the benefits that may be realized from the multila teral trade negotiations.
14 14 See Francois (2001a, esp. pp. 31-34) for an elaboration of how the usefulness of CGE modeling studies can be improved in applications to the Doha Round negotiations. 
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